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III.

JURISDICTION

This appeal is taken from an Order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment entered on February 21, 2006 in the Fifth Judicial District Court by the
Honorable G. Rand Beachum. This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j) of the Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD(S) OF REVIEW
Did the trial court commit reversible error in the standard it employed to determine
whether Mrs. Sohm met her burden with respect to establishing the damages element of a
prima facie negligence claim?
Did the trial court commit reversible error in granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and ruling that the testimony provided by Mrs. Sohm's medical
expert was insufficient to satisfy the damages element of a prima facie negligence claim?
Did the trial court commit reversible error in granting summary judgment in favor
of Defendants on an issue that was not raised by the Defendants and that neither party had
an opportunity to brief?
"On review of a summary judgment... the party against whom the judgment has
been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising
therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to him." Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813
P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). An appellate court accords no deference to a trial court's legal
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conclusions given to support the grant of summary judgment, but reviews them for
correctness." Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
V. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL WERE PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT
The issues on appeal were preserved in the trial court, to the extent possible,1 in
Plaintiffs Memorandum opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec.
318-422); oral argument advanced by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Attached as Exhibit C); and Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal, appealing
the Fifth District Court's Ruling and Order granting summary judgment in Defendants'
favor (Rec. 470-71).
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case; Course of Proceedings & Disposition in Court Below.
This case arises out of medical negligence committed by the Defendants in the care
and treatment they provided to Plaintiff Kathryn Sohm. Mrs. Sohm was diagnosed with
glaucoma and began receiving treatment for glaucoma in 1980. Defendants treated Ms.
Sohm for her glaucoma for a period of six years beginning in September, 1995 through
July, 2001. During this six year period, Defendants failed to properly manage Mrs.

l

The trial court granted summary judgment on grounds other than those raised by
the Defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment. However, the trial court's ruling
was apparently based upon the arguments and evidence presented by the parties in
support of and opposition to said Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the issues
raised as a result of the trial court's ruling are preserved in the memoranda and arguments
advanced by the parties in support of and opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
2

Sohm's glaucoma and, particularly during the last year of treatment provided by
Defendants, committed numerous breaches of the standard of care in their treatment and
management of Mrs. Sohm's glaucoma. As a result of Defendants' negligent care, Mrs.
Sohm sustained irreversible damage to her optic nerve and permanent loss of vision.
Mrs. Sohm's medical expert, Robert Stein, M.D., testified during his deposition
that Defendants breached the applicable standard of care in the medical treatment they
provided to Mrs. Sohm. He further testified that to a reasonable degree of medical
probability Defendants' respective breaches of the standard of care proximately caused
Mrs. Sohm to sustain damage to her eyes, including a permanent loss of vision.
Following Dr. Stein's deposition, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds that Mrs. Sohm had failed to establish causation because Dr.
Stein was unable to testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability with respect to
the percentage of vision loss Mrs. Sohm would have experienced in the absence of any
negligence. Mrs. Sohm opposed Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and oral
argument was heard by the trial court.
After reviewing the memoranda and evidence submitted by the parties and hearing
oral argument, the trial court declined to grant summary judgment on the issue of
causation raised by the Defendants, specifically stating that "[o]n the proximate cause
element, I find sufficient testimony in the deposition of Dr. Stein for Plaintiff to avoid
summary judgment." (Rec. 446-450, 462-64). Notwithstanding the trial court's
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conclusion that Plaintiff met her burden on the sole issue raised and challenged by
Defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Defendants on the altogether separate issue of damages, finding that
"Plaintiff has failed to provide any expert testimony which would allow a jury to
understand all of the possible causes of Plaintiff s vision loss and then to reach a just
verdict as to the damage which was caused by Defendant's negligence." (Rec. 449). The
trial court further concluded that "it is not sufficient for Plaintiff to simply provide expert
evidence that negligence proximately caused damage." (Rec. 449, 463). Mrs. Sohm
appeals the trial court's Ruling and Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of the
defendants.
B.

Statement of the Facts.
1.

Plaintiff Kathryn Sohm was diagnosed with glaucoma and began receiving

treatment for glaucoma in 1980. (Rec. 333, 411-12)
2.

Defendants treated Plaintiff for her glaucoma for a period of six years

beginning in September, 1995 through July, 2001. During that six year period, Dr. Snow
obtained only two visual field tests on Mrs. Sohm. (Rec. 333, 407)
3.

According to Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Robert Stein, the standard of care

requires the administration of a visual field test anywhere from every three to six months
or, at a minimum, once per year. (Rec. 333, 368)
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4.

Defendant Snow testified in his deposition that regular and timely visual

field tests were not obtained because Mrs. Sohm failed to show for two of the tests. (Rec.
334,407)
5.

Contrary to Defendant's Snow's initial testimony, he later admitted that he

only asked Mrs. Sohm to submit to Visual Field Tests on three occasions during his six
years of treatment, to wit: September 12, 1995, September 2, 1997 and March 7, 2001.
(Rec. 334, 355-63, 418-21)
6.

Of the three Visual Field Tests requested, Mrs. Sohm missed the one

scheduled for September, 1997, but had one performed in September, 1995 and another in
April, 2001 (rescheduled from the March 7, 2001 date), id.
7.

When Mrs. Sohm missed the Visual Field Test in September, 1997,

Defendant Snow admits that he did not attempt to reschedule the test. (Rec. 334, 407-08,
415-16)
8.

Defendant Snow further admits that he did not request or schedule a Visual

Field Test for Mrs. Sohm at all during calendar years 1996, 1998, 1999 and/or 2000.
(Rec. 334, 418)
9.

Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Robert Stein, testified in his deposition that the

standards in this country for treating glaucoma require observation and monitoring of
three things, to wit: the appearance of the optic nerve, the intraocular pressures, and the
visual field tests. In Dr. Stein's opinion, not one of these particular measurements can
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stand alone. Glaucoma "is a wily disease and requires the utmost vigilance to make sure
that it's under control." (Rec. 335, 367)
10.

According to Dr. Stein, Defendant Snow breached the applicable standard

of care in failing to conduct regular, serial visual field tests in his treatment of Mrs.
Sohm's glaucoma. (Rec. 335, 368)
11.

At the time of Plaintiff s initial visit to Defendant Snow's office, in

September, 1995, Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiffs intraocular pressures were 16
and 17 and that her glaucoma was well controlled. (Rec. 335, 355-63)
12.

In fact, Defendant Snow recommended that Mrs. Sohm continue with her

current glaucoma medications and made no changes to her medications at that time. IdL
13.

Plaintiffs next appointment with Dr. Snow was seven months later in April,

1996, at which time Dr. Snow noted intraocular pressures of 24 and 22 and concluded
that Mrs. Sohm's glaucoma was under "adequate to marginal control." Despite the rise in
pressures and the change from well controlled glaucoma to "adequate to marginal"
controlled glaucoma, Dr. Snow did not alter Mrs. Sohm's medications and simply
recommended that she continue as usual with the same medication regimen. (Rec. 335,
413)
14.

Over the course of the next three years, Plaintiffs glaucoma continued to be

generally and most often classified by Defendant Snow as under "adequate to marginal"
control. (Rec. 336, 355-63)
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15.

Then, in June, 2000, Mrs. Sohm's intraocular pressures significantly

increased, and Defendant Snow characterized her glaucoma as "under inadequate
control." (Rec. 336, 355-63)
16.

Prior to June, 2000, the highest intraocular pressure recorded by Dr. Snow

for Mrs. Sohm's right eye was 29 and her left eye was 22 (excluding the tensions taken of
the left eye following the cataract removal and Yag laser procedures performed in May,
1996 and May, 1999 respectively). kL
17.

On June 7, 2000, however, Mrs. Sohm had intraocular pressures of 60 and

46. Five days later, her pressures were still at 35 and 29. Dr. Snow characterized Mrs.
Sohm's glaucoma as under inadequate control on that visit. (Rec. 336, 355-63)
18.

Thereafter, Mrs. Sohm saw Dr. Snow for appointments on July 10, 2000,

July 31, 2000, August 7, 2000, December 14, 2000, February 9, 2001 and April 18, 2001.
On each of those appointments, with the exception of the appointment in August, Mrs.
Sohm's intraocular pressures remained at the highly elevated levels of: 30/32; 36/35;
30/26; 34/38 and 42/40 and her glaucoma continued to be classified as under inadequate
control by Dr. Snow. Id.
19.

During Mrs. Sohm's February 9, 2001 appointment, her pressures were 34

and 38. In spite of these extremely elevated pressures, as well as Dr. Snow's inability to
bring the pressures back down to an adequate level after months and months of
attempting to do so through the administration of eye drop medications, Dr. Snow's plan
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set forth in his chart following this visit was for Mrs. Sohm to return to his office for a
recheck in 4-6 months and to continue with her eye-drop medications. (Rec. 337, 35563)
20.

Notwithstanding this recommendation, Mrs. Sohm was seen for an

appointment two months later on April 18, 2001. During this appointment, Mrs. Sohm's
intraocular pressures were 42 and 40 (after drops that morning). (Rec. 337, 355-63)
21.

Additionally, Mrs. Sohm had a visual field test at that time that showed a

significant change and/or dramatic loss of her visual field.
22.

In spite of Mrs. Sohm's significantly elevated pressures, and the visual field

test results, Dr. Snow scheduled a cataract surgery, with a recommendation to consider a
filtering surgery (trabeculectomy) to address her glaucoma after the cataract removal. He
also instructed Mrs. Sohm to "continue current glaucoma medications" in spite of the fact
that they had failed to bring her pressures down since her last appointment. (Rec. 337,
355-63)
23.

Dr. Snow admitted during his deposition that it was his recommendation

that Mrs. Sohm have her right cataract removed before having a trabeculectomy and/or
any other surgical procedure that would address her glaucoma. (Rec. 338, 422)
24.

In the expert opinion of Dr. Stein, it was a breach of the standard of care in

this particular case to perform the cataract surgery before a trabeculectomy to bring Mrs.
Sohm's pressures under control. Specifically, Dr. Stein testified that "it was apparent that
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the intraocular pressure was fairly elevated at the time prior to that surgery. It's generally
not indicated to perform a cataract operation before considering the definitive lowering of
the intraocular pressure." (Rec. 338, 370)
25.

Furthermore, Dr. Stein testified that it would not be reasonable to perform a

cataract surgery before performing a trabeculectomy in this case because Mrs. Sohm's
visual field test taken one month prior to her surgery showed significant damage that her
glaucoma had caused, and "there is no reason to subject [her optic] nerves to the potential
for elevated eye pressure following surgery." (Rec. 338, 375)
26. Even Dr. Snow admits that it is possible to see pressures go up with a cataract
surgery. (Rec. 338, 414)
27.

Notwithstanding the "out of control" nature of Mrs. Sohm's glaucoma and

the visual field test results indicating a substantial change in Mrs. Sohm's visual
field, in May, 2001, Defendant Snow performed surgery on Mrs. Sohm to remove a
cataract from her right eye. Prior to the surgical procedure, the intraocular pressure in
Mrs. Sohm's left eye was recorded as 54. There was no measurement recorded with
respect to the intraocular pressure of Mrs. Sohm's right eye prior to surgery. (Rec. 339,
355-63)
28.

Following Mrs. Sohm's right cataract removal, her intraocular pressures

continued to remain uncontrolled. At the time of her one-week post-op visit, her
pressures measured 31 and 47. Id.
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29

Dr. Stein is critical of Dr. Snow's failure to follow up again with Mrs.

Sohm in a day or two instead of telling her to come back in one week. (Rec. 339, 377)
30.

At the time of her two week post op visit, her intraocular pressures

measured 19 and 36. (Rec. 339, 355-63)
31.

In addition to the high intraocular pressures, Mrs. Sohm also reported pain,

redness, swelling and "milky" vision during her post-operative appointments. She also
complained to Dr. Snow that she could not see out of her right eye. (Rec. 339, 355-63
and 400)
32.

Mrs. Sohm's next appointment was on June 29, 2001. During this

appointment, her intraocular pressures measured 60 and 48. (Rec. 340, 355-63)
33.

Even Dr. Snow testified during his deposition that when a pressure hits 60,

"you have to wonder what's going on." (Rec. 340, 410)
34.

Dr. Snow further admitted during his deposition that intraocular pressures

of 60 could be damaging the optic nerve. (Rec. 340,417)
35.

According to Dr. Stein, he is unaware of any eye that can tolerate that level

of pressure for any length of time. (Rec. 340, 378)
36.

During Mrs. Sohm's June 29, 2001 appointment, Dr. Snow characterized

her glaucoma as "out of control." (Rec. 340, 355-63)
37.

In spite of Mrs. Sohm's critical situation, and Dr. Snow's own

characterization of her glaucoma as "out of control", Dr. Snow did nothing with respect
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to providing Mrs. Sohm with emergent treatment or referring her to another medical care
provider for surgical intervention. Instead, he reduced the pressure in her right eye only
(with side-port drainage from the surgical site), discontinued her steroid medication and
told her to come back in two weeks. (Rec. 341, 355-63)
38.

Dr. Stein testified that he has "never heard of an eye that can tolerate that

pressure for any length of time. Yet, Dr. Snow asked the patient to return in two weeks.
I believe that to be completely out of line." (Rec. 341, 378)
39.

According to Dr. Stein, Defendant Snow's failure to treat Mrs. Sohm's

glaucoma as an emergent condition during the June 29, 2001 appointment was a breach of
the standard of care and proximately caused the loss of vision she sustained. In his
deposition, Dr. Stein compared the manner in which Dr. Tuck handled the situation when
Mrs. Sohm presented to his office two months later with almost the identical intraocular
pressures as she presented to Dr. Snow during the June 29, 2001 appointment:
You might extrapolate this entry and overlay it to the entry of the
subsequent treater, Dr. Tuck, in Virginia with almost very similar findings,
very high pressure, out of control. One doctor, Dr. Snow, chose to
essentially ignore the emergent problem. Dr. Tuck, on the other hand,
treated it as it should have been, as an acute, emergency requiring
immediate attention."
(Rec. 341,371-72)
40.

Dr. Stein further testified that it was "imperative to definitively make sure

that the pressure was lowered immediately after surgery so as not to create any
further nerve damage." (Rec. 342, 376-77)
11

41.

Following Mrs. Sohm's June 29, 2001 appointment, Dr. Snow left town on

vacation.
42.

Thereafter, on July 9, 2001, Mrs. Sohm was in agony with her eyes and

went to Defendants' office to see Dr. Snow. She had been experiencing pain all night and
believed she needed medical attention. Defendant Snow's office informed Mrs. Snow
that Dr. Snow was out of town, but told her that she could come back later and see Dr.
Ricks. (Rec. 342, 400)
43.

Accordingly, Mrs. Sohm returned to the office that same day for an

appointment with Dr. Ricks. On that occasion, Mrs. Sohm's intraocular pressures
measured 38 in both eyes. (Rec. 342, 355-63)
44.

In addition, she presented with a number of complaints and problems, and

expressed serious concern to Dr. Ricks regarding the condition of her eyes. She
explained to Dr. Ricks that she was very upset because she could not see well and her eye
was hurting her. She asked him what he could do for her. (Rec. 342,401)
45.

Dr. Ricks seemed very casual about Mrs. Sohm's high pressures and told

her he could give her another drop. He also told her that she needed an attitude
adjustment and wrote her a Poem entitled "Medication for Attitude" on a prescription
pad. The poem read: For every problem under the sun, there is a solution or there is none.
If there is one hurry and find it, if there is none, never mind it. Id.
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46.

Dr. Ricks then told her that she needed to make an appointment to see Dr.

Snow when he returned from vacation in "10 days or so." (Rec. 343,401)
46.

According to Dr. Stein, the standard of care required Dr. Ricks to either

follow Mrs. Sohm on a day-to-day basis to verify that her pressures were dropping
quickly or to refer her for a more aggressive treatment elsewhere. (Rec. 343, 381)
47.

Mrs. Sohm acknowledges that she did not make another appointment to see

Dr. Snow when he returned from his vacation because she was not satisfied with the care
she had been receiving. Under the circumstances, Mrs. Sohm felt that she needed to have
someone else look at her eyes. Mrs. Sohm's daughter in Roanoke Virginia had told her
that there was an excellent glaucoma specialist there that she should see. Consequently,
when Defendants failed to address Mrs. Sohm's needs and/or respond to her postoperative complaints regarding high pressures, pain, irritation and an inability to see very
well, she decided to go to Virginia to visit her daughter and see the glaucoma specialist
there. (Rec. 343, 402-03)
48.

Mrs. Sohm believed she had time to get in to see another physician for a

second opinion because Defendants had been so casual about her condition and had not
indicated to Mrs. Sohm that there was any urgency with respect to the condition of her
eyes. (Rec. 343, 404) In the interim, she continued to take the drops prescribed by
Defendants. Id.
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49.

The first appointment Mrs. Sohm was able to get was in early September,

2001, at which time she saw Dr. Tuck. According to Mrs. Sohm, Dr. Tuck was alarmed
at her extremely high pressures and immediately referred Plaintiff to Dr. Cotter for
emergent treatment. (Rec. 344, 405)
50.

Dr. Cotter immediately brought Plaintiffs pressures down and scheduled

her for emergent trabeculectomy procedures in both eyes. (Rec. 344, 405)
51.

Dr. Cotter stated in a letter to Alan Crandall, M.D. that Mrs. Sohm's

"markedly elevated intraocular pressures caused Mrs. Sohm to develop atrophy of the
neuroretinal rim which is contributing to the visual field deterioration." (Rec. 344, 38991)
52.

Although the excellent care and treatment provided by Dr. Cotter has

arrested Mrs. Sohm's glaucoma and stabilized the condition of her eyes, the damage
caused by Defendants' failure to properly treat Mrs. Sohm's glaucoma, prior to the time
she became a patient of Dr. Cotter's, is significant. Mrs. Sohm described her current
condition as follows:
I am legally blind in my right eye. Both of my eyes are in constant misery on a
daily basis. My left eye is like looking through a fog. My eyes water, and I feel like a
cotton ball is in my right eye. (I wear an eye-patch much of the time). I must wear
sunglasses in my house and outside most of the time. Extreme glare from light in both
eyes are foggy and images look like a white out. I see only slight images.
Because Defendant Ricks seemed so unconcerned about my condition and elevated
eye-pressures, and reassured me that I was fine and was in need of a change of attitude
only, rather than medical attention, I did not seek emergency treatment at that time. I
have since learned that Zion Eye Institute (Dr. Lewis) in St. George, a competitor of Dr.
14

Snow's Eye Center, could have taken care of my eyes and lowered my eye pressures at
that critical time if Defendant Ricks had only referred me to them.
My condition, as a result of the damage done to my eyes from my glaucoma that
was allowed to go unchecked and untreated, as well as the lens replacement surgery, has
completely changed my life. I now require assisted living. I can no longer drive; I cannot
enjoy and seldom watch television or movies; I cannot cook; I cannot read; I cannot play
the piano or sew; I cannot paint or draw anymore. These are all activities that I engaged
in on a daily basis prior to my surgery with Dr. Snow. I also lost a potential career that I
had planned to engage in with my daughter. We had planned to start an art business for
the sale of our paintings and drawings. Inasmuch as I can no longer paint or draw, I have
been unable to engage in that business endeavor. I used to be very active, happy and
totally independent before the damage to my eyes. Now, I am inactive, suffer from
depression and am totally dependent upon others to assist me in taking care of myself and
my needs on a daily basis.
(Rec. 344-45).
53.

Dr. Stein previously testified during his deposition that it is his expert

opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the breaches committed by
Defendants, as more fully set forth herein, are responsible for the damage to Mrs. Sohm's
eyes and the significant loss of vision she sustained in her right eye. (Rec. 345, 387-88)
54.

Dr. Stein graduated from the Chicago Medical School in 1976 with his

medical degree and went on to complete his Internship and Residency in Ophthalmology
at Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois. (Rec. 327, 392-93,
and 424-252)

2

PIease Note that the Trial Clerk made an error in numbering the record.
Pages 424-433 are repeated twice in the record, and the executed Affidavit of
Plaintiffs expert witness, Robert M. Stein, M.D. is located at the second set of pages
numbered 424-430 in the Record on Appeal.
15

55.

Dr. Stein has been an Assistant Professor at Rush Medical College from

1979 to the present and received his Board Certification from the American board of
Ophthalmology in 1983. (Rec. 327, 393 and misnumbered 425)
56.

Currently, Dr. Stein is an Attending Physician in Ophthalmology at Rush-

Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois and Rush North shore
Medical Center in Skokie, Illinois. (Rec. 327, 393 and misnumbered 425)
57.

During his medical career, he has had extensive experience in multiple

ophthalmic surgical procedures with an emphasis on cataract surgery with intraocular lens
implantation and anterior segment surgery including corneal transplants and refractive
surgery. (Rec. 327, 393 and misnumbered 425)
58.

He also maintains a private medical practice in general ophthalmology and

is active in teaching residents in training at Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center.
(Rec. 328, 393 and misnumbered 425)
59.

He is a member of the American Academy of Ophthalmology (Fellow), the

American Medical Association, the American Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery,
the Illinois State Medical Society, Chicago Medical Society and Chicago
Ophthalmological Society. (Rec. 328, 393 and misnumbered 425)
60.

He has published and lectured in his field of expertise and has enjoyed

memberships in ISMIE Risk Management Subcommittee on Ophthalmology; Quality
Assessment committee of SHARE Health Plan of Illinois; Quality Improvement
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Committee of United Healthcare of Illinois and has also acted as a consultant for the
Illinois State Medical Inter-insurance Exchange (reviewing closed malpractice cases for
the Physician's Review and Evaluation Committee). (Rec. 328, 393-94 and misnumbered
425-26)
61.

He has never previously testified as a Plaintiffs expert and, in his expert

review of medical malpractice cases, he has, as a general rule, always stood firmly with
the defense. With respect to this case, however, he has agreed to testify as an expert
witness on behalf of the Plaintiff, Kathryn Sohm, due to the compelling nature of the
negligence committed by the Defendants in this matter. (Rec. 328, 394 and misnumbered
426)
62.

In arriving at his opinions in this case, he reviewed all of Ms. Sohm's

medical records generated by the Defendants in this case as well as the medical records
documenting the care she received from the physicians that treated her subsequent to the
care she received from the Defendants, including the records of the Moran Eye Center,
the Vistar Eye Center, Dr. Cotter, Dr. Tuck , Zion Eye Institute, and Dr. Newman. He has
also reviewed the depositions of Mrs. Sohm, Dr. Cotter and Dr. Newman. (Rec. 329, 394
and misnumbered 426)
63.

In Dr. Stein's expert opinion, Mrs. Sohm's case has significant merit in that

there were numerous breaches of the standard of care in the treatment that was provided
to her by the Defendants. (Rec. 329, 394 and misnumbered 426)
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64.

It is also Dr. Stein's expert opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical

probability, that the Defendants' breaches of the standard of care caused Mrs. Sohm to
sustain substantial and permanent damage to her vision. (Rec. 329, 394 and misnumbered
426)
65.

In Dr. Stein's deposition, he identified multiple breaches of the standard of

care on the part of the Defendants including, without limitation, the following:
a.
b.
c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

Defendant Snow failed to conduct serial visual field tests in a timely
fashion;
Defendant Snow failed to adequately and properly document the
appearance of the optic nerve during routine visits;
Defendant Snow failed to adequately and definitively lower Mrs.
Sohm's intraocular pressures, particularly prior to the performance of
the cataract surgery on Mrs. Sohm's right eye;
Defendant Snow failed to perform and/or refer Mrs. Sohm for a
trabeculectomy on her right eye either prior to or in conjunction with
the cataract surgery in May, 2001;
Defendant Snow subjected Mrs. Sohm's right eye to an increase in
pressure by performing a cataract surgery at a time when her
pressures were already highly elevated and her recent visual field test
showed a significant change in Mrs. Sohm's visual field.
Defendant Snow failed to adequately and properly control Mrs.
Sohm's glaucoma and allowed her intraocular pressures to remain
consistently high and inadequately controlled for more than a year;
Both Defendants failed to give proper attention to Mrs. Sohm's
wildly fluctuating intraocular pressures along with her discomfort
following her cataract surgery in May, 2001;
Defendant Snow essentially ignored Mrs. Sohm's emergent
condition on June 29, 2001, when he acknowledged in his own
records that her pressures were "out of control" and proceeded with
essentially the same treatment regimen that had been previously, and
unsuccessfully, employed to regulate her pressures;
Defendant Ricks ignored Mrs. Sohm's emergent condition on July 9,
2001, when her pressures continued to remain at an elevated level,
by failing to refer her for emergent care, and/or failing to adequately
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lower and continue to monitor Mrs. Sohm's pressures on a day to
day basis to make sure that the pressures came down and stayed
down.
(Rec. 329-31, 394-96 and misnumbered 426-28).
66.

As stated in his deposition, it is Dr. Stein's expert opinion to a reasonable

degree of medical probability that the breaches set forth herein are responsible for the
damage to Mrs. Sohm's eyes and the significant loss of vision she sustained in her right
eye. (Rec. 331, 387-88, 396 and misnumbered 428)
67.

During his deposition, counsel asked Dr. Stein to testify with respect to

"percentages" in relation to how much better Mrs. Sohm's vision would be today if she
had not been subjected to negligent care as well as "percentages" in relation to how much
of the damage to her eyes was caused by the Defendants' negligence. As he testified
during his deposition, he cannot, nor could any intellectually honest physician, testify to a
reasonable degree of medical probability with respect to "percentages" of damage caused
by the Defendants' negligence or that would have existed, if any, in the absence of
negligence. (Rec. 331, 396-97 and misnumbered 428-29)
68.

On the other hand, Dr. Stein did testify in response to this line of

questioning that "there's a much greater likelihood that [Mrs. Sohm] would not have
suffered these visual field losses to this degree had there been intervention." (Rec. 331,
397 and misnumbered 429)
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69.

He further testified that in the absence of negligence, her vision could have

been "dramatically better." (Rec. 332, 397 and misnumbered 429)
70.

He also testified that while it is "hard to estimate how much, [sic] she

certainly with aggressive treatment might not have had any field loss at all." (Rec. 332,
397 and misnumbered 429)
71.

In response to Dr. Stein's opinion that it was possible that with aggressive

treatment Mrs. Sohm may not have experienced any loss of visual field, counsel asked
him if he could state that with any specificity to a reasonable degree of medical
probability, and he responded that "I can't really do that." (Rec. 332, 397 and
misnumbered 429)
72.

While Dr. Stein cannot testify that in the absence of negligence, Mrs. Sohm

would not have sustained any loss to her visual field, he can testify to a reasonable
degree of medical probability that in the absence of the Defendants9 negligence, Mrs.
Sohm's vision would be significantly better than it is today. (Rec. 332, 397 and
misnumbered 429)
73.

Similarly, while Dr. Stein cannot testify to a reasonable degree of medical

probability as to the exact "percentage" or "proportion" of damage that was caused as a
result of the breaches of care that he has articulated, he can unequivocally testify to a
reasonable degree of medical probability (as he already did in his deposition) that
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the negligence of the Defendants damaged Mrs. Sohm's eyes and caused her to
sustain a loss of vision. (Rec. 332-33, 397-98 and misnumbered 429-30)
74.

In Dr. Stein's expert opinion, and to a reasonable degree of medical

probability, the Defendants' many instances of negligent treatment and breaches of
the standard of care resulted in a direct consequence to the health and condition of
Mrs. Sohm's eyes and caused her to sustain both a significant and a permanent loss
of vision that she would not have otherwise sustained in the absence of their
negligence. (Rec. 333, 398 and misnumbered 430)
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary Judgment is generally inappropriate to resolve claims of negligence and,
in particular, issues concerning damages which are usually left to the exclusive province
of the jury. In the present case, Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of negligence
against Defendants with respect to all elements of her claim, including the damages
resulting from the defendants' negligence. At a minimum, issues of fact exist with
respect to Plaintiffs damage claim that preclude the entry of summary judgment as a
matter of law.
The trial court erred in the burden of proof it required of Plaintiff with respect to
establishing the damages element of her negligence claim. In order to establish a prima
facie negligence claim, Utah law does not require Plaintiff to prove what her condition
would be in the absence of the defendants' negligence or prove with precision the exact
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amount of damages attributable to the defendants. See, Tingev v. Christensen. 987 P.2d
588 (Utah 1999). Indeed, if a plaintiff suffers from an injury and/or a chronic condition
(such as Plaintiffs glaucoma) that is exacerbated by the negligent act of another, the
Utah Supreme Court has stated that if a jury can find a reasonable basis for apportioning
damages between the preexisting condition and the subsequent tort, it should do so.
Tingey. 987 P.2d at 592. However, the Court held that if the jury finds it impossible to
apportion damages between the preexisting condition and the defendant's negligence, "it
should find that the tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages." Id. (Emphasis
added). Furthermore, once a Plaintiff has established the "fact of damage." the defendant
bears the risk of any uncertainty with respect to the "amount of damage." and "the
defendant is not allowed to escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be
proved with precision." Tingev. at 592. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim does not fail and
summary judgment should not have been granted because Plaintiffs expert is unable to
testify with respect to what her vision would be in the absence of negligence and/or
identify the precise "percentage" of damage attributable to the defendants' negligent care.
The opinions given by Plaintiffs expert witness are more than sufficient to satisfy
the burden of proof with respect to the damages element of her claim. The testimony
provided by Plaintiffs expert is unequivocal with respect to the fact of damage resulting
from the defendants' negligence. Indeed, Plaintiffs expert, Robert Stein, M.D., testified
during his deposition, and subsequently by Affidavit, that the defendants' many breaches
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of the standard of care (which he discussed at length) proximately caused Mrs. Sohm to
sustain significant and permanent damage to her eyes, including a permanent loss of
vision. Any equivocation on the part of Plaintiff s expert was expressed only with
respect to what her condition would be in the absence of negligence and/or the precise
"percentage" of damage attributable to the defendants' negligence.
Based upon the rule of law set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Tingey. the
trial court's criticisms of the Plaintiffs expert do not cause Plaintiffs claim to fail or
form a proper basis for the granting of summary judgment in this case. Accordingly, the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment and its Order should be reversed.
VIII. ARGUMENT
A.

The Standards Required for Summary Judgment Have Not Been Met.
Summary judgment is generally inappropriate to resolve claims of negligence and

should be employed only in the most clear cut case. White v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 1371
(Utah 1994). With respect to the burden of proof, this Court has stated that "it only takes
one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the
controversy and create an issue of fact." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d
1282, 1292 (Utah App. 1996). In the present case, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants in spite of clear and unequivocal sworn expert
testimony, by both deposition and affidavit, that the defendants' many breaches of the
applicable standard of care in their treatment of the plaintiff proximately caused injury
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and damage to the plaintiff. See, Relevant Excerpts of Dr. Stein's Deposition (Rec. 366388) and Affidavit of Robert M. Stein, M.D. (Rec. 424-43O-misnumbered).
Under Utah law, a negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish four
elements:
" . . . that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; that defendant breached
the duty; that the breach of the duty was the proximate cause of Plaintiff s
injury; and that there was in fact injury."
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation, 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App.) In the present
case, Plaintiff has met each and every one of these elements. It is also well established
that there can be more than one proximate cause of the same injury. Id. In such cases, it
is not the burden of the plaintiff to provide expert testimony to apportion the damages
attributable to each proximate cause. Rather, that is a question of fact that rests within the
exclusive province of the jury. IdPlaintiff has provided expert testimony that the defendants' breaches of the
standard of care are responsible for the dramatic and permanent loss of vision she
experienced following a cataract surgery performed by Defendant Snow. (Rec. 387-88)
The medical evidence and fact and expert testimony on record in this case (particularly
when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff) create, at a minimum, material
issues of fact with regard to the damages resulting from the defendants' negligent care.
These issues of fact must be determined by a jury and necessarily preclude the entry of
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summary judgment in this case. Based upon the foregoing, the trial court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendants should be reversed.
B.

Utah Law Does Not Require the Plaintiff to Prove What Her Condition
Would Be in the Absence of the Defendant's Negligence or to Apportion or
Prove the "Percentage" of Her Damages Attributable to the Defendants.
The trial court erred in the burden of proof it required of Plaintiff with respect to

establishing her damages. In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendants argued that Plaintiff must be able to offer expert testimony with respect to
what her vision would have been in the absence of negligence and/or what "percentage"
of her injury is attributable to the Defendants. The trial court agreed. This is not, nor has
it ever been, a standard of proof required to establish the damage element of a negligence
claim. In fact, contrary to the defendants' contentions, if a plaintiff suffers from an injury
and/or a chronic condition (such as Plaintiffs glaucoma) that is exacerbated by the
negligent act of another, Utah courts have held that "the defendant should not escape
liability because the amount of damage cannot be proved with precision." Tingey v.
Christensen. 987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999) (Citations omitted) (Emphasis Added).3

3

This rule of law is not limited to claims of negligence but has been uniformly
applied in commercial and other types of cases as well. See: Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d
953, 956 (Utah 1983) (holding that "it is generally recognized that some degree of
uncertainty in the evidence of damages will not suffice to relieve a defendant from
recompensing a wronged plaintiff and " . . . it is the wrongdoer that must assume the risk
of some uncertainty."); Terry v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1981) (holding that " . . .
. the fact that the evidence upon which a court awards damages is sparse is no reason to
deny all recovery for a wrong."); Registered Physical Therapists, Inc. v. Jepson. 584 P.2d
857, 849 (Utah 1978) (holding that "where damages are attributable to the wrong of the
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In Tingev v. Christensen. the Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident
that aggravated pre-existing injuries, conditions and/or ailments. In light of her preexisting conditions, Mrs. Tingey requested that the trial court give the following jury
instruction:
Where a pre-existing condition exists which has been aggravated by the
accident it is your duty, if possible, to apportion the amount of disability
and pain between that caused by the pre-existing condition and that caused
by the accident. But if you find that the evidence does not permit such an
apportionment, then the defendant is legally responsible for the entire
ailment or disability.
Tingey. at 591 (Emphasis added). The trial court declined to give this instruction. On
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not giving the proposed
instruction and that the proposed rule of law stated therein "is correct, and we adopt it."
Id at 592 (Emphasis added). The Court cited and relied upon the following legal
principles in support of its decision:
[F]irst, a tortfeasor takes a tort victim as he or she finds the victim (citations
omitted); second, a tortfeasor should bear the burden of uncertainty in the amount
of a tort victim's damages (citations omitted); and third, once the fact of damage is
established, 'a defendant should not escape liability because the amount of damage
cannot be proved with precision.' (citations omitted)
Tingey. at 592 (Emphasis added); see also: Robinson v. All-Star Delivery. Inc.. 992 P.2d
969, 972 (Utah 1999). The legal principles cited in the Tingev decision are directly

defendant and are only uncertain as to amount, they will not be denied even though they
are difficult of ascertainment."); and Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983)
(ruling that it would be "unjust to deny recovery where the fact of injury or loss can be
proved simply because there is difficulty in assessing its amount.")
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relevant to the case at hand and contradict the trial court's ruling that "it is not sufficient
for Plaintiff to simply provide expert evidence that negligence proximately caused
damage." See: Ruling, page 4 (Rec. 449); and Order, page 2 (Rec. 463).
In the present case, Mrs. Sohm suffered from chronic glaucoma. (Rec. 333, 41112) Notwithstanding her chronic glaucoma, her vision had remained stable and
unaffected by her glaucoma for many years until she received negligent care from the
defendants. (Rec. 335, 355-63,412) Plaintiffs expert witness, Robert Stein, M .D.,
testified in his deposition and by affidavit that Defendants' negligent care proximately
caused Mrs. Sohm to sustain permanent damage and loss of vision. (Rec. 366-88 and
misnumbered 424-430) In so testifying, Dr. Stein unequivocally established the fact of
damage. When asked what Mrs. Sohm's eyesight would have been in the absence of
negligence, Dr. Stein testified that with aggressive care, she may have sustained no loss
of vision at all. (Rec. 332, 397 and misnumbered 429) Because Dr. Stein was unwilling
to testify with precision with respect to how Mrs. Sohm's glaucoma might have
progressed or not progressed in the absence of the Defendants' negligence, or assign a
specific percentage to the amount of vision loss attributable to the defendants' negligence,
the defendants contend and the trial court ruled that Plaintiffs claim fails.
Under Tingey, however, if any uncertainty exists with respect to the damage
caused by the Defendants' negligent care, that is an uncertainty that must be borne by the
Defendants. Tingev. 987 P.2d at 592. Furthermore, once the "fact of damage" has been
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established, as it has in the instant case, the defendant is not permitted to escape liability
because the "amount of damage" cannot be proved with precision. Id.
After considering the three legal principles cited and discussed above, the Tingev
Court held as follows:
We hold that if a jury can find a reasonable basis for apportioning damages
between a preexisting condition and a subsequent tort, it should do so; however, if
the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it should find that the tortfeasor
is liable for the entire amount of damages.
987 P.2d at 592 (Emphasis added). This holding is significant to the present case for a
number of reasons. First of all, the holding makes it clear that it is up to the jury, not the
Plaintiff, to apportion damages between those caused by the defendants' negligent care
and those resulting from her preexisting glaucoma. Second, it reaffirms that the
defendants, not the Plaintiff, bears the burden of uncertainty, if any exists, in the amount
of Mrs. Sohm's damages that can be attributed to the defendants. It is also clear from this
holding that the Plaintiff is not required to produce expert testimony with respect to what
"percentage" of damage is attributable to the defendants' negligence and what percentage
of damage would have occurred in the absence of negligence as a result of her preexisting chronic condition.4

4

At the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs counsel
asserted that to require plaintiffs suffering from chronic, pre-existing conditions (such as
Mrs. Sohm's glaucoma in instant case) to prove what his or her condition would be in the
absence of negligence would be, in many instances, to require the impossible and would
thereby preclude that entire class of Plaintiffs (individuals with preexisting, chronic
conditions) from ever being able to assert claims for medical negligence. (See: Transcript,
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Finally, and of greatest import to the issue on appeal, is the Court's holding that if
the jury is unable to apportion damages between the defendants' negligence and a
preexisting condition, the Plaintiffs claim DOES NOT FAIL as a matter of law as the
defendants and the trial court concluded in the instant case. Rather, in such an instance,
the jury is required by law to hold the defendants legally responsible for the ENTIRE
injury and/or damage suffered by the Plaintiff. Tingey, 987 P.2d at 592.
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court held Plaintiff to the wrong
burden of proof with respect to her damages in this case and erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. Accordingly, the trial court's entry of summary
judgment in this case should be reversed.
C.

The Testimony of Dr. Stein Satisfies Plaintiffs Burden with Respect to Her
Damages.
The trial court erred in finding that Dr. Stein's expert testimony was insufficient

evidence of the damage caused by the Defendants' negligence. Dr. Stein testified during
his deposition that it is his expert opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability
that the numerous breaches of the standard of care committed by Defendants, as more
fully set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, damaged Mrs. Sohm's eyes and are
responsible for the loss of vision she sustained. (Rec. 332-33, 387-88, 397-98 and
misnumbered 428-30) (Rec. 428-430-misnumbered) There is nothing equivocal about

page 21, attached as Exhibit C) To require this level of proof would be manifestly unjust
and would set an "unholy precedent." Id.
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this statement or Dr. Stein's opinion that Defendants' negligent care resulted in injury and
damage to Mrs. Sohm. Id. The extent of the damage Mrs. Sohm experienced as a result
of the Defendants' negligence is best articulated by her in her vivid description of the
changes she experienced in her vision (set forth in detail in the Statement of Facts,
paragraph 52, above), following the surgery performed by Defendant Snow in May, 2001
and during the ensuing months as Defendants repeatedly failed to address her concerns or
bring her pressures under control. The changes and damages described by Mrs. Sohm
speak directly to the loss of vision Dr. Stein attributes to Defendants' negligent care.5
In spite of Dr. Stein's unequivocal opinions with respect to the damage caused by
the Defendants' negligence, the trial court found as follows:
On the issue of damages, however, Dr. Stein entirely fails to identify or
establish what damage was caused by Defendants' alleged negligence.
While the parties all attempted in various ways to have Dr. Stein explain
what damage may have occurred due to the Defendants' alleged negligence,
he failed to do so. Dr. Stein could not identify any damage-by type, extent
or nature-that a jury could use as a basis of an award for damages. Dr.
Stein was unable to make even vague assertions to a reasonable medical
probability. If Dr. Stein cannot measure, describe, compare, quantify,
identify, isolate, gauge, estimate, apportion or delimit the damages which
may have been caused by Defendants' alleged negligence, no jury can be
expect to do so without engaging in rank speculation.
(See: Order, paragraph 3, attached as Exhibit B)

5

See also: Opinion of treating Physician, Dr. Cotter, who has given the opinion that
Mrs. Sohm's "markedly elevated intraocular pressures caused Mrs. Sohm to develop
atrophy of the neuroretinal rim which is contributing to the visual field deterioration."
(Rec. 344, 389-91)
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Plaintiff asserts that the trial court's criticisms of Dr. Stein's opinions, as set forth
in the trial court's Order quoted above, are inapplicable to the testimony he has given
with respect to the damages caused by the defendants' negligence and pertain only to Dr.
Stein's inability to predict, with certainty, what Mrs. Sohm's condition would be in the
absence of the defendants' negligence. This assertion is borne out upon a review of the
specific statements made by Dr. Stein with which the defendants and the trial court have
taken issue.
For example, Defendants asked Dr. Stein if he could testify with respect to "what
[Mrs. Sohm's] particular level of eye vision would be at this point" if she had not been
subjected to the negligent treatment of Defendants. In response thereto, Dr. Stein
answered "No." Defendants did not ask Dr. Stein, however, if he had an opinion with
respect to whether her vision would be better if the negligence had not occurred. Instead
Defendants wanted Dr. Stein to commit himself to testimony regarding a "particular level
of eye vision." While Dr. Stein could not predict the particular level of vision Plaintiff
would have today if she had not been subjected to negligent care, he has testified that it is
his expert opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that Plaintiffs vision
would most certainly be better than it is today if she had not been subjected to
Defendants' negligent care. (Rec. 332, 397 and misnumbered 429)
Dr. Stein has also testified that while it is "hard to estimate how much, [sic] she
certainly with aggressive treatment might not have had any field loss at all." (Rec 333,
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379, 397 and misnumbered 429) Defendants and the trial court take issue with this
opinion because when Defendants asked Dr. Stein if he could verify that to a reasonable
degree of medical probability, he testified that he "can't really do that." (Rec. 332, 380,
397 and misnumbered 429) With regard to this statement, it is important to note that Utah
law does not require Dr. Stein to verify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that
Plaintiffs glaucoma would not have progressed in the absence of negligence. Rather,
Plaintiff is only required to offer expert testimony to a reasonable degree of medical
probability that the defendants' negligence caused Plaintiff to sustain injury and/or
damage. Dr. Stein has so opined during his deposition, and by Affidavit as well, and
Plaintiff has satisfied her burden in this regard. See. Relevant Excerpts of Dr. Stein's
Deposition (Rec. 366-388) and Affidavit of Robert M. Stein, M.D. (Rec. 424-430misnumbered).
Again, Plaintiffs burden of proof does not require her to produce expert testimony
with respect to what the status of a chronic medical condition would be in the absence of
the Defendants' negligence and/or to verify to a reasonable degree of medical probability
that the pre-existing condition would not have worsened at all. Accordingly, the
equivocal nature of the two statements made by Dr. Stein during his deposition, as
discussed above, is irrelevant and does not provide a valid basis for the granting of
summary judgment.
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Defendants' final criticism of Dr. Stein's testimony is his unwillingness to quantify
the "percentage or proportion" of the damage that was caused as a result of the
Defendants' breaches of care. During his deposition, counsel asked Dr. Stein to testify
with respect to "percentages" in relation to how much better Mrs. Sohm's vision would
be today if she had not been subjected to negligent care as well as "percentages" in
relation to how much of the damage to her eyes was caused by the Defendants'
negligence. In response thereto, Dr. Stein has testified that he cannot, nor could any
intellectually honest physician, testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability with
respect to "percentages" of damage caused by the Defendants' negligence or that would
have existed, if any, in the absence of negligence. (Rec. 331, 396-97 and misnumbered
428-29)
On the other hand, Dr. Stein did testify in response to this line of questioning that
"there's a much greater likelihood that [Mrs. Sohm] would not have suffered these visual
field losses to this degree had there been intervention." (Rec. 331, 379, 397 and
misnumbered 429) He further testified that in the absence of negligence, her vision
could have been "dramatically better" (Rec. 332, 379, 397 and misnumbered 429) and
with aggressive treatment, she might not have sustained "any" loss of visual field at all
(Rec. 332, 379, 397 and misnumbered 428). Utah law does not require Plaintiffs expert
to quantify the "percentage or proportion" of the damage caused by the Defendants'
negligence. Apportionment of liability, if there is any in this case, is within the exclusive
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province of the jury. It is not required of experts, and it is not a valid basis to grant
summary judgment in this matter. Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that Dr. Stein's
opinions are sufficient to establish the damages element of Plaintiff s negligence claim.
Accordingly, the trial court's order granting summary judgment on this issue should be
reversed.
As set forth in the preceding section of Plaintiff s argument, the Plaintiffs claim is
not dependent upon her ability to apportion her damages between her pre-existing
condition of glaucoma and the damage caused by the Defendants' negligent care. In fact,
if the jury is unable to apportion Mrs. Sohm's damages between the negligence of the
Defendants and her preexisting glaucoma, the jury is required by law to hold the
defendants legally responsible for the entire damage. See. Tingey v. Christensen. 987
P.2d 588 (Utah 1999). Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding the testimony of
Plaintiffs expert to be insufficient to withstand summary judgment, and the Order
granting summary judgment in favor the defendants should be reversed.
D.

The Affidavit of Dr. Stein Does Not Contradict His Deposition Testimony and
Should Not be Excluded Under Webster v. SilL
The trial court's conclusion that the affidavit of Dr. Stein contradicts his deposition

testimony and cannot therefore be used to create a genuine issue of fact is in error.
Specifically, the trial court is critical of Dr. Stein's statement in his affidavit that in the
absence of the Defendants' negligence, Mrs. Sohm's vision would be significantly better
today. (Rec. 429—misnumbered) During the taking of Dr. Stein's deposition, defense
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counsel did not ask if Mrs. Sohm's vision would, in general, be better or worse in the
absence of the defendants' negligence. Instead, defense counsel insisted that Dr. Stein
testify as to the "particular level" of vision that Plaintiff would have in the absence of
negligence. Notwithstanding Dr. Stein's inability to testify as to a "particular level" of
vision in the absence of negligence, he has testified to the following:
(1) It is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that in the
absence of the Defendants' negligence Mrs. Sohm's vision would be significantly
better than it is today. (A question that was not asked during his deposition) (Rec. 332,
397 and misnumbered 429); and
(2) In my opinion, and to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the
Defendants' many instances of negligent treatment and breaches of the standard of
care resulted in a direct consequence to the health and condition of Mrs. Sohm's
eyes and caused her to sustain both a significant and a permanent loss of vision that
she would not have otherwise sustained in the absence of their negligence. (Rec 333,
398 and misnumbered 430).
Neither of these statements contradicts anything Dr. Stein testified to during his
deposition and should be allowed to stand.
E.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment On the Issue of
Damages.
In the present case, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds

that Plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between the defendants' breaches of
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the standard of care and her injuries and damages. Ruling against the defendants on the
sole issue raised in their Motion, the trial court stated "[o]n the proximate cause element,
I find sufficient testimony in the deposition of Dr. Stein for Plaintiff to avoid summary
judgment." See: Ruling, page 2, attached as Exhibit A; and Order, page 2, attached as
Exhibit B. Notwithstanding the trial court's conclusion that Plaintiff met her burden on
the sole issue raised and challenged by Defendants in their Motion for Summary
Judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the
altogether separate issue of damages, finding that "Plaintiff has failed to provide any
expert testimony which would allow a jury to understand all of the possible causes of
Plaintiffs vision loss and then to reach a just verdict as to the damage which was caused
by Defendants' negligence." Ruling, page 4, attached as Exhibit A. The trial court
further concluded that "it is not sufficient for Plaintiff to simply provide expert evidence
that negligence proximately caused damage." Ruling, page 4 and Order. Page 2, attached
as Exhibits A and B respectively.
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
grounds that were neither raised in the Defendants' moving papers nor argued at the
hearing on Defendants' Motion. Inasmuch as the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment was brought on the issue of causation only, and the trial court found that
Plaintiff had met her burden with respect to causation, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment should have been denied.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the standards required
for summary judgment have not been met; that the trial court erred in the burden of proof
it required of Plaintiff with respect to the damages element of her negligence claim; that
the trial court erred in concluding that the testimony of Plaintiff s expert witness, Robert
M. Stein, M.D., was insufficient to establish Plaintiffs damage claim; and that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff has
presented sufficient evidence of her damages to survive summary judgment and, at a
minimum, when the evidence is construed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there
are material issues of fact that preclude the entry of summary judgment in this matter.
Accordingly, Plaintiff hereby requests that the trial court's Order granting Summary
Judgment in favor of Defendants be reversed.
DATED this

'JL

(jr

day of September, 2006.
EISENBERG, GILCHRIST & MORTOJ

'Hyj&JAfywrJn
JADQUE^NN D. CARMICHAEL
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Kathryn Sohm
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this^> oay"<of September, 2006,1 caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be served, by hand-delivery, upon
the following:
Stephen W. Owens
Epperson & Rencher
Attorney for Appellee Jeffrey R. Ricks, O.D.
10 West 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah
Christian W. Nelson, Esq.
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Attorney for Appellees Dixie Eye Center &
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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X. ADDENDUM
Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Attached as Exhibit A

Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Attached as Exhibit B

Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendants' Motion
For Summary Judgment

Attached as Exhibit C
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IN TEfE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOJ
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF""
KATHRYN SOHM,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 030501946
Judge G. Rand Beacham

vs.
DIXIE EYE CENTER, etal.
Defendants.

This matter came before mdpursuant to "Defendants* Motion for Summary Judgment." The
parties filed their respective memoranda and supporting materials, and I heard oral arguments. I
have now studied the memoranda, affidavits, excerpts from deposition transcripts and other
materials, and I have considered the legal authorities cited by the parties. Having fully considered
the matter, and lacking time to wrike more, I have decided to grant Defendants' Motion with this
brief explanation.

!

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs medical expert "does not and cannot establish the element
of causative damages and was unable to state, within a reasonable degree of medical probability,
what level of vision Plaintiff would have had if Defendants had complied with what he believes to
be the standard of care." Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p, 2. This involves two
elements of Plaintiff s negligence claim, proximate cause and damages. I have had some difficulty
ascertaining the precise facts and issues regarding these issues, because of (a) the parties' efforts to
"spin" statements made by expert witnesses and (b) some excessive involvement with irrelevancies
such as the element of breach of the standard of care. Most of the parties* effort is spent on the
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proximate cause issue, but I find the damages issue to be dispositive.
On the proximate cause element, Ifindsufficient testimony in the deposition of Dr. Stein for
Plaintiff to avoid summary judgment. Dr. Stein did testify, in response to a leading question, that
he could conclude, to a reasonable medical probability, that Defendants' alleged breaches of the
standard of care in fact caused damage to Plaintiffs vision. Deposition ofStein, p. 117,1.23 to p.
118,1. 2. Dr. Stein's affidavit is, to this extent, consistent with his deposition testimony: "I can
unequivocally testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability... that the negligence of the
i

Defendants damaged Mrs. Sohm's jsyes and caused her to sustain a loss of vision." Affidavit of Stein,
f 21. I agree with Defendants that some of Dr. Stein's other statements are equivocal and uncertain
and, without more, would be insufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs burden to avoid summary judgment.
In the entire context of Dr. Stein'stestimony,however, Ifinda sufficient issue regarding proximate
cause to prevent summary judgment.
On the issue of damages, however, Dr. Stein's testimony entirely fails to identify or establish
what damage was caused by Defendants' alleged negligence. Much of the argument on this issue
relates to the nature of Defendant's questions as to "percentages" or "proportion" of damages
!

caused by Defendants' negligencejto which Plaintiff heartily objects, as in the Stein affidavit: "I
cannot, nor could any intellectualljy honest physician, testify to a reasonable degree of medical
I

probability with respect to 'percerjtages' of damage caused by the Defendants' negligence . . ."
Affidavit of'Stein, ^ 15.

I

While that statement may or may not be correct, Plaintiffs problem is that, without some
expert to identify the damage caused by Defendants' alleged negligence, a jury would be left with

nothing but speculation as a basis for any damages award. Dr. Stein agreed that there were several
i

other possible or probable causes Ajvhich may have contributed to Plaintiffs vision loss, but he was
i

unable or unwilling to opine as to Jheir relative causal effects. This is not to suggest that Plaintiffs
expert must directly answer a quesjion about "percentages," but Plaintiff must produce some expert
j

who is willing to tell the jury whatj damage was caused by Defendants.
On this issue, Dr. Stein himself was speculating. He was adamant that some damage was
I
. caused by Defendants, but he never identified any damage—by type, extent, or nature—that a jury
could use as the basis of an awarik. His most direct testimony on the subject was that, but for
Defendants' negligence, Plaintiffjs vision "could have been dramatically better," that "with
aggressive treatment [Plaintiff] might not have had anyfieldloss at all," and other such conjectural
statements. Ultimately, Dr. Stein was unable to make even such vague assertions to a reasonable
degree of medical probability. Deposition ofStein, p. 74,1. 13 to p. 75,1. 6 (emphasis added).
Even in the "last-ditch" effort of his affidavit, he only added: "I can testify to a reasonable
i

degree ofmedical probability that inj the absence of the Defendants' negligence, Mrs. Sohm's vision
i

would be significantly better than ft is today." Affidavit of Stein, f 2 0 . This, too, fails to raise a
i

genuine issue of fact or of law. Fir?t, this affidavit statement is somewhat contrary to Dr. Stein's
deposition testimony that he could not opine as to what Plaintiffs vision would now be even if she
had been treated according to his opinion of competent care, and a genuine issue cannot be created
byfilingan affidavit in contradiction to a witness's prior testimony. Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170
(Utah 1983). Second, what Dr. Steik stated in his affidavit with regard to Defendants' negligence
could be stated with similar certainty with regard to each of the other possible causes of Plaintiff s

vision loss, such as the glaucorha itself, Plaintiffs advanced age, and Plaintiffs occasional
noncompliance with Defendants' {^commendations.
CONCLUSION
It is not sufficient for Plaintfff simply' to provide expert evidence that negligence proximately
caused damage. Plaintiff must also provide expert evidence as to what damage was proximately
caused.
Plaintiff has failed to provide any expert testimony which would allow a jury to understand
all of the possible causes of Plaintiffs vision loss and then to reach a just verdict as to the damage
which was caused by Defendants'! negligence. If Dr. Stein cannot measure, describe, compare,
quantify, identify, isolate, gauge, estimate, apportion or delimit the damages which may have been
proximately caused by Defendants' negligence, no jury can be expected to do so without indulging
in rank speculation. There is no genuine issue of material fact on this point, and Defendants

are

entitled to judgment as a matter of aw.
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. Defendants'
counsel should submit an appropriate judgment.
Dated thisdT-y day of January, 2006.

^Cia^Aaaejfail^^
JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM
STATE OF UTAH
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COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
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Stephen W. Owens
Attorney for Defendant Ricjks
10 West 100 South, Suite 500
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Christian Nelson
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P.O. Box 2465
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Telephone: (801) 531-2000
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN SOHM,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
DIXIE EYE CENTER, RONALD L. SNOW,
M.D. and JEFFREY R. RICKS, O.D.,

Case No. 030501946
Judge G. Rand Beacham

Defendants.
On January 24, 2006, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court.
Plaintiff was represented by her counsel of record, James E. Morton. Defendant Dr. Jeffrey R.
Ricks was represented by his counsel of record, Stephen W. Owens. Dr. Ronald L. Snow and
Dixie Eye Center were represented by their counsel of record, Christian W. Nelson. Having
reviewed the matter at issue, including Defendants' Motion and related memoranda, Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants'

Reply Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, and after oral argument presented
by the parties, the Court hereby finds as follows:
1.

In order to present a prima facie cause of action of medical negligence, expert

testimony regarding the issue of proximate cause and damages is necessary. It is not sufficient for
Plaintiff to simply provide expert evidence that negligence proximately caused damage. Plaintiff
must also provide expert evidence as to what damage was proximately caused by the alleged
negligence.
2.

Plaintiff has presented expert testimony through Dr. Robert Stein on issues of both

proximate causation and damages. Concerning proximate cause, Dr. Stein has presented
sufficient testimony to support Plaintiffs claims to survive Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
3.

On the issue of damages, however, Dr. Stein entirely fails to identify or establish

what damage was caused by Defendants' alleged negligence. While the parties all attempted in
various ways to have Dr. Stein explain what damage may have occurred due to Defendants'
alleged negligence, he failed to do so. Dr. Stein could not identify any damage - by type, extent,
or nature-that a jury could use as a basis of an award for damages. Dr. Stein was unable to make
even vague assertions to a reasonable medical probability. If Dr. Stein cannot measure, describe,
compare, quantify, identify, isolate, gauge, estimate, apportion or delimit the damages which may
have been caused Defendants' alleged negligence, no jury can be expected to do so without

i

2

indulging in rank speculation. Furthermore, Plaintiff has no expert witness other than Dr. Stein to
identify the damage caused by Defendants' alleged negligence.
4.

Plaintiff attempted to bolster Dr. Stein's testimony by submitting an affidavit

wherein Dr. Stein testifies that absent Defendants' acts or omissions, Plaintiffs vision would be
significantly better today. However, Dr. Stein's affidavit is somewhat contradictory to his
deposition testimony wherein he stated that he could not opine as to what Plaintiffs vision would
be without the alleged negligent acts or omissions of Defendants. Consistent with Webster v. Sill
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), the Court finds that a genuine issue of fact cannot be created by
filing an affidavit in contradiction of a witnesses' prior testimony. Moreover, statements by Dr.
Stein regarding Defendants' alleged negligence could be made with similar certainty about each of
the other possible or probable causes of Plaintiff s vision loss, which include the progressive
nature of glaucoma, plaintiffs advanced age and plaintiffs non-compliance among other things.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with
prejudice and on the merits.
Dated this ^ \

day of

V ^

, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

CS\ILJI

fatedls**^

HONORABLE G. RAND BEACHAM
District Court Judge

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order On
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgement was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this
day of
, 2006 to the following:

James E. Morton
Jacquelynn D. Carmichael
EISENBERG, GILCHRIST & MORTON
900 Parkside Tower
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Stephen W. Owens
EPPERSON & RENCHER
lOWest 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Jeffrey R. Ricks, O.D.
Christian W. Nelson
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah84144
Attorneys for Dixie Eye Center and Dr. Ronald Snow
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on November 23, 2005)

3

(Court already in session when recorder was turned on)

4

THE COURT:

5

others.

(Inaudible) Sohm vs. Dixie Eye Center and

It's file 030501946. We have Counsel here. Who

6 I represents whom?
7 I

MR. MORTON:

James Morton for plaintiff, your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9 I

MR. NELSON:

Chris Nelson for Dr. Snow.

10

MR. OWENS:

Stephen Owens for Dr. Ricks.

11

THE COURT: All right. We have your names on the

12

calendar; everyone is here.

13

copies.

I appreciate getting the courtesy

I've reviewed those. So I guess we will start with the

14 I defendant's argument.
15

MR. NELSON:

16 I Chris Nelson.
17

Thank you, your Honor. Again, my name is

I represent Dr. Snow.

Honor, Ms. Sohm, the plaintiff in this matter, is 85-years-old.

18 I She suffers from glaucoma.

She was diagnosed with glaucoma 40

19

years ago —

20

medications 25 years ago in 1980.

21
22

By way of background, your

over 40 years ago in 1963. She began taking glaucoma

Glaucoma, your Honor, is a progressive disease of
a person's eyes, and there are different types of glaucoma.

23 I Glaucoma is the second leading cause of blindness in the world.
24

Vision loss or impairment due to glaucoma is characteristically

25 I associated with a cupping of the neural retinal rim.

I'm not

~3~

1

sure I completely understand that, your Honor, but as the doctors

2

have described this, that cupping or excavation can extend — and

3

usually does extend to the rim of the retina. When you see that,

4

there's usually associated vision loss.

5

Glaucoma is also associated with higher than normal

6

intraocular pressures of the eye, and those pressures can be

7

relieved sometimes; sometimes they can't be. The pressure —

8

there's some debate whether or not that pressure is caused by

9

the glaucoma, or whether the glaucoma causes the pressure. A

10

doctor's ability to control those pressures, your Honor, depends

11

on the type of glaucoma that the patient is suffering from, the

12

person's medical history, whether they're compliant with taking

13

medications and seeing the doctor, and the progression of the

14

disease itself.

15

Ms. Sohm had been undergoing treatment for several

16

years before she came to see Dr. Snow and Dr. Ricks. They began

17

treating her in 1995, and they continued treatment until 2001.

18

In 2003 Ms. Sohm brought this action against both Dr. Ricks and

19

Dr. Snow for medical negligence.

20

The basis of the motion generally, your Honor, that

21

was filed by the defendants is that Ms. Sohm has not been able

22

and cannot establish a causal relationship between her injury,

23

and that's her vision to —

24

care that either was or was not provided based on the allegations

25

that Ms. Sohm has made by Dr. Snow and Dr. Ricks.

or impairment to her vision, and the

-41

There's some question after reading the memoranda

2

that we received from Ms. Sohm's Counsel as to whether or not the

3

defendants can even pursue that —

4

it's based on lack of causation between the injury and the care

5

in question.

6

this type of a motion. Again,

In our opening briefs, your Honor, we cited several

7 I cases that number one, state that in order to establish a
8

prima facie case or cause of action of negligence for medical

9

malpractice the plaintiff has the burden to establish this causal

10

relationship between the injury and a breach of the standard of

11

care.

12

expert testimony or evidence because it's beyond the experience

13

of the jury.

14

dismissal of the cause of action is appropriate.

15

In medical malpractice cases that has to be established by

If the plaintiff can't meet this burden then

Two weeks ago, your Honor —

if I could approach.

I've

16 I got a copy of a case that just came down.
17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

MR. NELSON:

Your Honor, this just was issued less

19

than two weeks ago.

20

it's —

21

Tri —

22

plaintiffs opened a movie theater in Utah County, and they

23

retained the defendant —

24

providing consultation and financing for that movie theater.

25

It's a case that addresses causation, and

was addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals.
excuse me — Tri Salt (phonetic) case.

It's the

In that case the

it's a financial company —

to help in

Later another movie theater was opened by another

-51

company and the same services by the same defendant company

2

were retained.

3

defendant's help, the second theater took away people that went

4

to movies from the first theater, and they experienced a loss in

5

their profit. The case was dismissed on summary judgment by the

6

trial Court based on a lack of causation argument like we're

7

making here today, your Honor.

8
9

The plaintiffs allege that as a result of the

The argument that the plaintiff had made in that case
was that as soon as the second movie theater opened the first

10

theater began to experience this loss in profits. There was some

11

question about whether they could prove an actual relationship

12

between those loss of profits as something the defendant did.

13

On page 6 of the opinion the Court talks about the

14

causal element of a negligence cause of action.

15

of lines there it says, "Utah Courts have held that summary

16

judgment on the issue of causation is appropriate,

17

notwithstanding the general rule that causation is a jury

18

question, when the plaintiff cannot show that a jury could

19

conclude without speculation that the injury would not have

20

occurred but for the defendant's breach." That's exactly what

21

we're talking about in this motion, your Honor, before the Court.

22

Down a couple

In that case the Court went on to say that, "Because of

23

the issues therein —

financial issues —

expert testimony was

24

required to establish this causal link."

25

medical malpractice case. So I think based on the ruling — not

That's the same as this

-61

just this ruling, your Honor, but prior rulings by the appellate

2

courts in Utah, this is the type of motion that can be addressed

3

by summary judgment.

4

MR, MORTON:

Your Honor, if I could interrupt for just

5 J a moment, and I don't mean to be impolite.
6

I'm —

it's very

difficult to argue about a case that you haven't seen until it

7 I was handed to you (inaudible).

I haven't read the case.

I don't

8

confess to have discovered it before now, but I would have

9

appreciated a copy of it before just now.

I thumbing through it

10

and I'm trying to read it, but I'm not sure it's comparing apples

11

with apples.

12

THE COURT: Yeah.

13

MR. MORTON:

And (inaudible).

14

MR. NELSON:

Your Honor, and I appreciate that.

15

I don't

like to be handed a case on the day of the hearing, either. The

16 I only reason I knew about this case is my office was involved, and
17

like I say, it came down less than two weeks ago.

It's not

18 I different, though, than the cases we cited in our brief.
19

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

20

MR. NELSON:

The law is not unique to this case, and so

21

it's not unusual; but there are similarities with this case.

22

I understand what Counsel is saying, but it's not a different

23

situation than the cases we've cited in our opening brief.

24

Okay.

Turning to the facts, then, of this case, your

25 I Honor, we have deposed three, I believe — at least two of

So

~7~
1

Ms. Sohm's treating physicians outside of Dr. Ricks and Dr. Snow.

2

Ms. Sohm has retained an expert witness. The defendants have

3

retained their own expert witnesses. We have all that testimony

4

now and evidence, and now it's time to decide whether Ms. Sohm

5

can reach that causal link and establish that causal link between

6

her injury and conduct of the defendants.

7

One of the doctors that was deposed is a Dr. Cotter,

8

treating doctor of Ms. Sohm.

Recall, your Honor, that vision

9

loss can be caused by things beyond just glaucoma, and there's

10

some question about whether glaucoma is the cause in Ms. Sohm's

11

case of her vision loss.

12

second —

13

due to ischemia of the optic nerve; in other words, death or

14

impairment to the optic nerve rather than glaucoma.

15

Dr. Cotter —

and I'll read this in a

talked about the fact that maybe her vision loss is

On pages 46 and 47 of his deposition — and we've

16 I attached this, your Honor, to our brief. A question was asked:
17

Q.

18

Have you seen patients with some

eye conditions that Ms. Sohm is experiencing?

19

A.

I've seen patients with glaucoma where

20

the vision — visual field loss and is out of

21

proportion to the cupping.

22

That's what I talked about earlier in the neural retina

23
24
25

rim.
A.

With that intraocular pressures, it

is fairly uncommon in my experience.

-81

Q.

What would cause that condition?

2

A.

Well, part of what we need to explore —

3

you know, right after I got done operating with

4

Ms. Sohm she went away. One thing that can cause

5

that is somebody has an acute rapid rising of

6

intraocular pressure and sustained at that level,

7 I

that can actually cause ischemia to the nerve, and

8

in (inaudible) kill the nerve.

9 I

That's different than glaucoma, your Honor.

Dr. Cotter

10

went on to explain that because he didn't know what was causing

11

her vision problems he thought that she ought to be evaluated by

12

another physician.

13

he said —

14

causing the vision problems.

15

On pages 16 and 17 of Dr. Cotter's deposition

again, talking about his inability to decide what was

A.

There, you know, this creates a bit of

16 1

a dilemma because as you may or may not be aware,

17

characteristically in glaucoma there is an evacuation

18 I

of the neural retinal rim, which is path —

19

I'm going to mispronounce this.

20
21
22
23

-

A.

— pathognomonic with glaucoma.

Q.

Which you didn't find here?

A.

Which I did not.

I did not find an excess

here to match the visual field.

24

Q.

All right.

25 I

A.

In other words, the visual field loss

-9was out of proportion to the amount of excavation.
And he goes on to talk about this ischemia. So
Dr. Stephen Newman evaluated Ms. Sohm, and he talked about
these reasons for her vision loss as well.

This doesn't even

have anything to do, your Honor, with the care provided by the
defendants.

It's trying to understand and explain why she's

having these vision problems and whether or not it's even
glaucoma.
In his report Dr. Newman said —
this is attached to our brief.

this is —

I believe

If not, his testimony, which I'll

read in a minute, is regarding this issue. "There is no question
that she has optic neuropathies in both eyes, right worse than
left; presumably related at least in part to glaucomatous
damage."

Presumably.
"She has a long history of elevated intraocular

pressures, some increase in cupping, an arcuate visual fields
with construction, all of which are compatible with glaucoma. The
preserved central acuity OS," —
right eye —

that refers to, I believe, the

"is most compatible with glaucomatous etiology, as

is the history of preserved central acuity with the other eye,
(inaudible) glaucomatous damage that is even more advanced."
Then he says, "The hooker is the relative lack of
cupping and possible diffused nerve fiber bundle dropout in one
of the eyes.

I can't rule out some other cause of optic nerve

pathology, but I'd be quite surprised if anything else turned

-101 I up.'' So again, Dr. Newman is not really sure what's causing
2

her vision problems.

3

certain.

4

He think it's glaucoma, but he can't be

He goes on later in his deposition, your Honor, to

5 I explain that he thinks that it probably is glaucoma, but he also
6

recommended a study to evaluate that, and that study was never

7 I done to my knowledge.
8

So that's the first issue, whether or not glaucoma is

9 I even causing these problems. That's what she was treating with
10

Dr. Snow and Dr. Ricks for. Assuming, your Honor, that glaucoma

11

is the cause of Ms. Sohm's vision problems, Dr. Newman — again,

12

one of her treating doctors —

13

deposition —

14

was asked this question.

15

on pages 54 and 55 of his

this is attached to our briefs, your Honor —

Q.

I take it you've seen patients like

16 I

Ms. Sohm have received excellent care along the

17

way and —

18

A. Yes.

19

Q. —

20

A. Absolutely.

are still in her position.
I have plenty of patients

21

like her that have lost vision in one eye from

22

glaucoma.

23

their medicines or don't follow directions, whether

24

it happens —

25 I

take medicines and follow directions.

Whether that's because they don't take

or whether it happens even if they

-111

He went on to say, your Honor, that even with the best

2

of care she may still be in the same condition that she's in

3

today with her vision.

4

Dr. Styne, who is the expert that was retained by the

5

plaintiff, Ms. Sohm, in the case was asked similar questions. On

6

page 30 •— and we've cited all these references, your Honor, in

7

our brief, but on page 30 of his deposition he was asked:

8

Q. Would you agree generally, Doctor, that

9

this loss of vision in a case like Ms. Sohm's can

10

occur even with the best of care?

11

His answer:

12

A. Yes.

13
14
15

This is Ms. Sohm's expert.

Later this exchange took

place.
Q.

Do you agree that even if Ms. Sohm

16

had been treated as you believe she should have

17

been treated we can't say what her particular

18

level of vision would be at this point?

19

A. No.

20

Q.

Is that correct?

21

A.

That's correct.

22

Q.

Do you have an opinion, for instance,

23

that if she had been treated like you believe she

24

should have been treated she would have had a 20

25

percent better vision than she does today?

Or do

1

you have any —

2

those issues?

3

There is an objection by me, your Honor, that it

4

required speculation.

5 I

A.

or do you have no opinion on

The answer was:

There is a much greater likelihood

6

that she would not have suffered these visual field

7 I

losses

8 I
9 J

to this degree had there heen intervention.
Q.

It's too this degree that I'm trying to

figure out.

Do you have an opinion that the degree

10 J

of her eye loss, had she been treated appropriately,

11

would have been a certain percentage better or any

12

comment on that or not?

13
14 I
15
16 I
17

A.

I believe in this day and age it could

have been dramatically better.
Q.

Can you put that in terms of any kind of

scale you want to put it into?
A.

It's hard to estimate how much, but

18 I

she certainly with aggressive treatment might not

19

have had any visual field loss at all. She could

20 J

have had varying degrees of visual field loss.

21

could have extended to a situation where she

22

essentially had no loss of visual field.

23 J
24
25 I

Q.

Can you state that with any specificity

to a reasonable degree of medical probability?
A.

It

I really can't do that.

-131

You can see from those questions we were trying to

2

get some kind of a quantification or some kind of an evaluation

3

of how much visual field loss, if any, was related to the

4

defendant's care or the allegations of the breaches of the

5

standard of care. Dr. Styne, Ms. Sohm's own expert, couldn't do

6

that. Whether in any kind of a range, by percentages, he just

7

wasn't able to do that.

8
9
10

Finally, on page 119 of his testimony a question was
asked:
Q. Well, she sustained some damage to her

11

eyes from the time she started treating with these

12

doctors. We've established that. The percentage

13

and proportion of the damage that was caused as a

14

result of the breaches of care that you articulated,

15

you are unable to quantify; is that fair?

16
17

A.

That's correct.

This is similar to the Tri Salt case that I referred to

18

earlier where the movie theater opened and the profits began to

19

drop after that. The timing was there, but there was no causal

20

link established by experts. That's what we have in this case by

21

plaintiff's own expert.

22

THE COURT: Well, the plaintiff tries to make the

23

distinction that in the one instance you're talking about whether

24

there is a causal relationship, and the other instance you're

25

talking about whether you can put a specific number or percentage
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2

on it.
MR. NELSON:

Right, and I recall those arguments, your

3

Honor. As you can see from those questions of Dr. Styne, the

4

first question that was asked was could he establish any causal

5

link, and finally, the concluding question on page 119 that I

6

just read asks that same question.

7

He wasn't able to do that.

To further help him refine that, we said, "Well, help us

8

either by percentage or by any range you want to give us. Help

9

articulate, if you can, what degree of harm or injury was caused

10

by the defendant's care." So the question was asked to help

11

refine that, but he still couldn't do it. So I think both

12

questions were asked.

13

In addition to that —

14 I that's been made, your Honor.

and I understand that argument
In the responsive pleading that

15

Ms. Sohm filed, there's 28 pages of factual statements given;

16

it's quite lengthy. Of that 28 pages I counted only 13 paragraphs

17

that relate to the causal allegations that we've raised in our

18

motion for summary judgment. The other paragraphs —

19

pages — have to do with Ms. Sohm's medical history and

20

allegations as to the breach of standard of care. That's a

21

different element.

several

That's not the element that we're talking

22 I about in our negligence in our cause of action.
23
24

The paragraphs that do talk about the causal element are
paragraphs 4(c), 7(k), 7(1), paragraph 11 and then paragraphs 13

25 I through 21. Paragraph 4(c) states this:

"Dr. Newman testified
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to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Ms. Sohm's

2

optic neuropathy is the result of her glaucoma, and not any other

3

medical condition or disease."

4

Again, there's some debate about that, but that doesn't

5

tell us anything about the care of the defendants. That talks

6

about the disease and what's caused from the disease, glaucoma,

7

which she already had before the she saw the defendants.

8

The other paragraphs, your Honor, that I referenced that

9

do relate to the causal element of Ms. Sohm's negligence cause of

10

action arise because of Dr. Styne's affidavit that he submitted

11

after we filed our motion for summary judgment. We filed a reply

12

pleading, your Honor, addressing that; and I believe Utah law is

13

clear that you can't use an affidavit after a motion like this

14

has been filed to contracdict a person's own deposition

15

testimony.

16

To the extent that Dr. Styne is doing that — and I'm

17

not sure that he is doing that or trying to do that, but as you

18

read through his affidavit and compare that with his deposition

19

testimony, it appears that he's trying —

20

Dr. Styne trying to raise an issue of fact when I don't think

21

there was an issue by his deposition testimony on the causal

22

element of the case.

23

contradiction, that can't be done under Utah law.

24
25

or Ms. Sohm is through

So to the extent that there is a

If the Court does choose to accept his affidavit — by
the way, the copy I got is unsigned.

I don't —

I've never
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received a signed copy.

2

received a signed copy of Dr. Styne's affidavit.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. MORTON:

It may be out there, but I've never

I was going to ask if it was.
We did submit a notarized affidavit, and if

5 I for some reason I didn't serve it, I apologize, but I —
6

MR. NELSON:

I assumed it had been.

7

MR. MORTON:

It's identical to the unsigned one.

8

THE COURT: Right.

9

MR. NELSON:

10

I just —

Thank you. To the extent your Honor is

willing to accept that affidavit, in the affidavit, again

11 J Dr. Styne uses this language.

"In the absence of negligence her

12

vision" — Ms. Sohm's vision —

"could have been dramatically

13

better.

14

estimate how much better she would have been without — with

15

aggressive treatment."

It's hard to estimate" —

this is a quote —

"hard to

Dr. Styne opined that, "It was possible

16 I that with aggressive treatment Ms. Sohm may not have experienced
17 J any loss of vision."

So the affidavit includes that type of

18 I language.
19

If Dr. Styne, your Honor, can't provide us any guidance

20

regarding the causal link between the injury and the care

21

provided by the defendants, he's a medically trained doctor —

22

specialist in this area, how can a jury, if this case is allowed

23

to go to the jury, make that decision?

24

speculate regarding this causal link, both as to whether or not

25

there is a causal link in the first place, and then the extent —

The jury is left to
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again, considering the preexisting nature of this disease that

2

Ms. Sohm had, the fact that it had —

3

that she sustained significant injury before she began treating

4

with Dr. Snow and Dr. Ricks, issues about compliance, non-

5

compliance, that kind of thing. That requires speculation under

6

the case law. The jury can't be allowed to speculate.

7

it's progressive, the fact

Finally, your Honor, I focused on the treating

8

doctor's testimony and with Dr. Styne, the plaintiff's expert,

9

but the defendants have their own experts. They've also said

10

that the determination of causation requires pure speculation.

11

Thank you, your Honor.

12

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Nelson.

13

MR. OWENS:

I'll be brief, your Honor. Again, Steve

14

Owens for Dr. Jeffery Ricks who's an optometrist here in town who

15

actually only saw Ms. Sohm on two occasions.

16

There really is no dispute among the medical experts on

17

this fact that there can be no quantification of the damages that

18

are causally linked to this case.

19

because we're dealing with an 84-year-old person, and they've

20

testified that advanced age subjects are to more risk for loss of

It's really not surprising why

21 I eyesight. The nature of the disease, just glaucoma is a
22

progressive disease.

She's had cataracts. She has diabetes,

23

which has implications for sighjb. She has high blood pressure,

24

which has high implications for sight.

25

issues for glaucoma.

She has family history

She has had 40 years of eyesight issues, 20
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of which have been for glaucoma, and there are a number of other

2

conditions.

3

follow up in a timely fashion.

She didn't go to certain appointments or didn't

4

She still has some vision in both eyes.

5

has excellent vision in her left central vision.

6

peripheral, but left central, and some vision in her right.

7

So it's not like we're dealing with a completely blind person.

8

So again, we're sort of what percentages of what percentage of

9

sight. She didn't have perfect vision when she came to see these

10
11

In fact, she
So not the

doctors.
These —

and then she's been to several doctors since

12

then. So when I went to Chicago with these gentlemen — well,

13

with Chris and Jim's colleague, I was interested.

14

the breach stuff, and we'll let them assert that to the jury. I

15

was interested, and I think all the testimony that was read were

16 I my specific questions.
17

He outlined

I wasn't trying to be tricky or anything.

I said, "Doctor, I need to know, what would she be seeing like if

18 I she hadn't had these breaches of care that you're asserting?'' He
19

said, "I can't say."

20

how. "You do it and give me a percentage or any scale that you

21

feel comfortable with."

22

within a reasonable degree of medical probability?" "I can't."

23
24

I asked it every way possible that I knew

"I can't do it." "Can you say anything

I wasn't trying to be tricky.

I knew exactly what I was

trying to ask, and I think he understood it. He didn't say he

25 I didn't understand it. He said, "No intellectually honest

-19physician could make that determination in this case." And on
that there is no dispute.
Now there is this effort —

and you should knowf our

firm almost all does medical malpractice cases.

I depose these

experts weekly almost, and I ask them the same question.
Sometimes they say, "Well, if that vascular surgeon hadn't have
messed up, more than likely than not this man wouldn't have lost
his leg." Or, "If that cancer had been found quicker, more
likely than not this man wouldn't have died."
questions in every expert deposition I give.
question.

I mean I ask those
It's not a trick

I ask about the duty, breach, causation and damages.

That was the issue, and there was an effort, I think, in this
subsequent deposition to try to rehabilitate them.

If you look

at the wording, he talks about —
THE COURT: You mean deposition or affidavit.
MR. OWENS: Excuse me, I do mean affidavit of Dr. Styne.
You know, there might have been none —
tell us anything, your Honor.
doesn't tell us anything.
degree, but again —

no loss.

That doesn't

It may have been better. That

Could have, might have, not to this

and at one point he does say significant,

okay, so there's that term. What is significant loss?
a one percent loss, or is that a 90 percent loss.

Is that

What scale?

What does it even mean?
I think the affidavit needs to be looked at with the
deposition when he was being cross examined under oath in person

-201

eyeball to eyeball.

2

it. He can't tie t h a t — in a sense that engine —

3

engine to that caboose.

4

was all we were trying to get him to do.

5

He said on multiple occasions he couldn't do

He's trying to put that together, which

Your Honor, a jury is not going to know.

6

railroad

If these five

physicians, and I'm counting all our experts and these treaters

7. I who can't put it together, who can't tie those two things
8

together, the breach and the damages, if they can't do it and

9

they've looked at every deposition, every affi —

and every

10 I medical record, this jury of eight lay folks is going to say,
11

"What do we do?

12

We don't know."

Even if they find all the damages, are they going to

13

base that on how much they like the witness?

I don't know.

14 I They're not going to do it on the science because the science
15

says no reasonable intellectual scientific evaluation can be

16

made of that. Trust me, these experts say it all the time.

17

It's not a unique question.

18 I

This idea —

it is clear from all the testimony this

19

vision can occur despite appropriate care. Someone in her

20

position who had great care can have her same vision. Your

21

Honor, this will be speculation to submit this to a jury, and I

22

think a jury is going to be confused as to what damages when each

23

of the experts is going to have to testify they don't know.

24
25

He'll say —

he may come in and say, "Well, not to this

degree," but what does that mean?

We need to know, and without
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it it's pure speculation.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MR. MORTON:

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you, Mr. Owens.

Even though I had a very neatly organized

4

argument, your Honor, I think —

5

things first.

6

a standard where an expert is required to apportion with respect

.7

to a person who has a chronic disease process what percentage of

8

harm is attributable to the negligence as opposed to the natural

9

disease process.

10

and I need to address some

I believe the first item is this whole concept of

If that requires speculation, which I have something to

11

say about as well, then literally every person —

12

in Mrs. Sohm's position, whether it be with glaucoma, diabetes or

13

any other condition that could worsen where someone could lose a

14

limb or someone could —

15

people start to suffer very grave consequences as time goes on.

16

Yet, you know, there are —

17

victim of medical malpractice because a doctor cannot say this is

18

attributable to the disease process and this is attributable to

19

the malpractice.

20

single person situated like that would be ineligible to prosecute

21

a medical malpractice case.

22

every plaintiff

I mean diabetes is very common that

are we saying that they cannot be a

So it sets an unwholly precedent because every

I think the one issue that would allow this to go to the

23

jury and allow the jury to deliberate on the contribution of the

24

malpractice as opposed to the natural progression of the disease

25

process is educating the jury with respect to the natural
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progression of the disease process. Then you have to look at a

2

temporal issue. That temporal issue is this, that in the year

3

preceding this catastrophic loss of visual acuity —

4

all due respect because I do have great respect for both of the

5

lawyers I'm dealing with here, but I have met and escorted

6

Kathryn Sohm who is functionally blind.

7

her right eye.

8
9

and with

She cannot see out of

When they talk about excellent central vision in the
left eye, she has no peripheral vision.

She has a complete

10

inability to care for herself.

11

clean.

She cannot just do regular activities of daily living.

12

It's —

as Dr. Styne testified, she was permitted under the care

13

of Dr. Snow and Dr. Ricks to go for a year with extraordinary

14

high intraocular pressures, which he said literally puts someone

15

on the threshold of their eye almost exploding.

16
17

She cannot cook.

She cannot

We even see comments in the medical record where alarm
is expressed by Dr. Snow, but he doesn't do anything about it.

18 I He doesn't make any attempt to do anything other than continue
19

her on a medicine trial, which she's been on for a long time and

20

which has proven to be ineffective.

21

Then miraculously when she finally decides that she's

22

not getting any help, she goes to Virginia. Actually is treated

23

by Dr. —

24

Dr. Cotter, who is a nationally renowned glaucoma expert.

25

first Dr. Tuck sees her and then she's referred to

Dr. Cotter gets her in for an emergency surgery right
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away, and this was done —

2

procedure done to drop her pressures, and then she's taken into

3

surgery.

4

she has an immediate temporary

That's what should have happened.
The jury is going to be able to look at this compounding

5

of essentially tolerance of these extraordinarily high pressures

6

which every doctor in this case is going to have something to

7

say about. The — and then that coupled with the fact that

8

she then —

9

cataracts that Dr. Snow is going to do cataract surgery before

a determination is made that because she also has

10

he does the surgery to address the glaucoma, which Dr. Styne

11

indicates was a horrible mistake.

12

loss of visual acuity.

13

Then you have a catastrophic

Now if you're on a jury and you're following this time

14

line and let them say four years. There's been a discussion

15

about four years of glaucoma, 20 years of glaucoma. She's

16

followed by these doctors, I believe, seven years. Interestingly,

17

the last year she's followed she is —

18

had pressures under 30, and 30 is considered a very high

19

pressure. As Dr. Styne put it, she was a time bomb. That time

20

bomb was ticking, and then ultimately you have this amazing

21

profound loss of visual acuity.

22

I think one time may have

Counsel made reference to Dr. Newman and his deposition.

23

One of the things that gets discussed is even under the best of

24

care someone can lose visual acuity, and that can be attributable

25

to non-compliance of the patient or any number of things. This
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is what —

and another thing that Mr. Nelson said was that

2

Dr. Newman could not rule out another disease process,

3

specifically an ischemic condition as opposed to glaucoma.

4

The way this worked in sequence is Dr. Newman was

5

actually Dr. Cotter's professor at the University of Virginia,

6

who is a highly specialized nationally renowned ophthalmologist.

7

He had referred, because of some unique findings with respect to

8

Mrs. Sohm, he had referred her to see Dr. Newman, and she did in

9

fact go see Dr. Newman.

10

When Dr. Newman was questioned in his deposition — and

11

this page —

12

There's a question:

13

this is at Exhibit C on the opposition memorandum.

Q.

You don't have any information to

14

indicate that Kathryn Sohm has not been compliant

15

in taking her —

16

A. Absolutely not.

17

MR. OWENS: Your answer again?

18

THE WITNESS: Absolutely not.

19

Q.

Thank you. And I understand you can't

20

100 percent rule out some other cause of optic

21

nerve pathology, but can you tell me to a reasonable

22

degree of medical probability that it's more likely

23

than not that the etiology of her optic neuropathy

24

is in fact glaucoma?

25

A. Yes.
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I — you know, the problem is that this case is deemed

2

defended in sound bytes, and getting into the standard; questions

3

of negligence are frowned upon by the appellate court to be

4

disposed of on summary judgment, and in particular, questions of

5

causation.

6

With respect to the causation issue, it's generally

7

reserved for the jury, and if reasonable inferences can be drawn

8

from the evidence on the issue of causation, the matter then

9

needs to go to the fact finder. The standard is not —

there is

10

no standard imposed upon an expert witness to testify that this

11

percentage of the injury is the consequence of the malpractice;

12

this is attr —

13

else.

the other percentage is attributable to something

14

The only standard is is that there was a breach of the

15

standard of care that proximately caused an injury, and it's an

16

injury in fact.

17

doesn't have to be — a person can have a constellation of

18

injuries, but if in fact the doctor committed negligence and

19

it resulted in any injury —

20

statements from Dr. Styne and other treating physicians that in

21

fact this malpractice, this professional negligence, caused an

22

injury to Ms. Sohm.

23

It doesn't have to be the entire injury. It

and the record is replete with

It's curious how these questions about what degree of

24

visual acuity loss would she have sustained had there been no

25

negligence.

That is a difficult question for anyone to answer.
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Nobody can answer that. Nobody has a crystal ball, and every one

2

of these cases is unique. The reality is is that when you phrase

3

it that way, you're actually expected to —

4

be able to say that all people are exactly alike, they progress

5

exactly alike, they have these conditions which have typical

6

patterns they follow, and that's not the case with glaucoma.

7
8

you're expected to

THE COURT: How do you avoid having the jury very
possibly award damages for something not caused by the

9 I professional?
10

MR. MORTON:

It's a determination that needs to be made

11

by the jury not only with expert testimony where the expert is

12

going to hone in on a particular acts of malpractice, but then

13

also this temporal issue that I'm talking about.

14

something that is a rapid onset loss of visual acuity that —

15

and the jury can decide if it's coincidental.

This is

I think had that

16 I question been asked in the deposition, I think it could have been
17

answered, or if more probably than not it was a result of

18 j malpractice.
19

The law is also clear that there has to be a single

20

piece of sworn testimony in the form of an affidavit or

21

deposition or otherwise that says that to a reasonable degree of

22

medical probability this professional negligence caused injury,

23

and it's just injury in fact.

24

jury to tease out these issues.

25

It's within the province of the

I've certainly had cases where juries have been
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confronted with much more complex issues when it comes to

2

apportioning fault and attempting to relegate a certain degree of

3

fault to a particular defendant or —

4

that goes on the verdict that may not have any responsibility at

5

all legally to respond, and that's what the jury system is all

6

about.

7

in some instances someone

You have people who collectively make those types of

8

decisions.

If the evidence is not satisfactory to go to the jury

9

after the plaintiff puts on her case in chief, then that's where

10

you intervene.

To try and dispose of it on a summary judgment

11

motion, it's simply improvident.

12

argument that people with chronic diseases are essentially

13

eliminated from filing medical malpractice cases would set a

14

completely unwholly precedent in the State of Utah or anywhere.

15

Unless you have any questions, your Honor, I'll submit it.

16

THE COURT: No.

17

Okay.

18

MR. NELSON:

In particular, this whole

Thank you.

I appreciate that.

Mr. Nelson?
Thanks, your Honor.

Just briefly, that's

19

exactly —

this argument that when there's chronic disease

20

involved and different things that play that may explain why a

21

patient's condition is as it is, that's exactly why you need

22

expert testimony.

23

to sort through that. Allowing the case to go to the jury and

24

then after the evidences that we have now before us, present it

That's why Utah law requires expert testimony

25 I to the jury, that same evidence, and then leave it with your
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Honor to decide at that point is exactly why we have summary

2

judgment motions and why we've raised these issues now before

3

your Honor.

4

The evidence that you have is the same evidence that's

5

going to be presented at trial. So that's why —

6

purpose of our motion.

7 I

that's the

As far as the high pressures, the intraocular pressures

8

and whether surgery should have been performed earlier or later,

9

these non-compliance issues, those are issues dealing with the

10

standard of care. There are factual disputes about that. That's

11

not what this motion is about.

12

link between the standard of care and the injury.

13

Dr. Newman —

This motion is about the causal

Counsel read a portion of his deposition

14

about whether or not he had any comment about Ms. Sohm's non-

15

compliance. He said that he had only seen her once so he couldn't

16 I comment on that. He didn't know.
17
18 I

He didn't review all the

medical records.
Also, as to whether or not she —

her vision loss is due

19

to the glaucoma, as I said earlier, he assumed that it was. I

20

think I read you a portion of the deposition about that. Then

21

the question was asked:

22

Q.

In terms of glaucoma — again, I take

23

it you've seen patients like Ms. Sohm that have

24

received excellent healthcare along the way and —

25 I

He interrupted and said:
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A. Yes.

2

Q.

— a r e still in her position?

3

A.

Absolutely.

I have plenty of patients

4

like her that have lost vision in one eye from

5

glaucoma, whether that's because they don't take

6

their medicines or don't follow directions, or

.7

whether it happens even if they take their medicines

8

and follow directions.

9

So in terms of glaucoma he was asked the question. He

10

said, you know, they may be still in her same position even when

11

they follow directions, even when they take the medications that

12

they're supposed to take.

13

So as the Court has ruled, "Summary judgment on the

14

issue of causation is appropriate when the plaintiff cannot show

15

that a jury could conclude without speculation that the injury

16

would not have occurred but for the defendant's breach." That's

17

why these questions were asked. Again, Dr. Styne was asked those

18

very questions.

"But for the defendant's breach can you show,

19 I absent speculation, what Ms. Sohm's condition would be?" Again,
20
21
22
23
24
25

the question was asked:
Q.

Would you agree generally, Doctor —

This is Dr. Styne.
Q.

—

that loss of vision in a case like

Ms. Sohm's can occur even with the best of car?
A. Yes.
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That's a general reference to the standard of care

2

breaches that he had been talking about in his deposition.

3

Again, the concluding question of the deposition of Dr. Styne

4

was:

5

Q. Well, she sustained some damage from

6

her eyes from the time she started treating with

7

these doctors. We've established that. But the

8

percentage or proportion of the damage that was

9

caused as a result of the breaches of care that

10

you articulated, you're unable to quantify.

11

that fair?

12
13

A.

Is

That's correct.

Again, the standard in Utah is whether or not the

14

plaintiff can show without speculation that the injury would not

15

have occurred but for the defendant's breach.

The expert has to

16 I sort through all those questions, has to decide, well, this
17

vision loss is due to the defendant's breach.

18

existed before she began treating with the defendants. This is

19

due to the progression of the disease or non-compliance; that's

20

why we need experts. With that help from the experts a jury can

21

only speculate, and that's not allowable under Utah law. Thank

22

you, your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

This had already

So how do we deal with Mr. Morton's argument

24

that people then with chronic disease just are going to be at a

25

loss for a malpractice case, even if it actually occurs?
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MR. NELSON: And I think the law does deal with that.

2

I think again —

and I do a lot of medical malpractice cases,

3

too. That's exactly again why we have experts to sort through

4

that issue to tell us, "Jury, this problem was caused by the

5

defendant's breach and care, this loss of a finger, this heart

6

attack," whatever; lack of taking medication that was not

7

prescribed that should have been.

8

That's why the Utah law is you've got to have experts testify

9

about these issues because a jury won't understand that, and an

That's why we need experts.

10

expert will help us sort through those issues. Here we've got a

11

case where an expert can't help us sort through it. Thank you,

12

your Honor.

13

THE COURT: Thank you.

14

Mr. Owens?

15

MR. OWENS: Your Honor, we all can express sympathy for

16

Ms. Sohm's loss of vision.

17

dispute as to the key material fact, which is the medical experts

18

cannot attribute or give any kind of guidance to a jury as to

19

what the causes of damages would be in this case.

20

It's not the issue here. There is no

Medical experts do this all the time, your Honor. I

21

have a case involving a fellow who was disabled, fell on the ice

22

and fractured his spine. They're saying he got substandard care

23

from the physiatrist and these folks who cared for his spine. I

24

asked these exact questions of their damages expert, and he said,

25

xv

He is 25 percent worse off than he would be otherwise."
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Now he walked into my client's office in canes and he

2

kind of walked out with a walker, but these were the questions.

3

How much worse —

these medical experts do it all the time with

4 I chronically injured people, how much worse off they were. We
5

didn't box Dr. Styne into saying you have to give us a

6

percentage.

7

he said he couldn't.

We said in any way that you can articulate, and

8

The rehabilitation affidavit, now Styne talks about

9

not to this degree or that it was significant, but what does

10

that mean?

11

know.

12

Is a one percent loss of vision significant?

I don't

He said that he was unable to say so.
This is a very complex patient.

Just given her age,

13

her health conditions that go to eyesight —

high blood pressure,

14

cataracts, diabetes, and we need science —

15

in and tell us —

16

are so that the jury can decide which of the opinions is

17

contrary.

these guys that come

at least give us an opinion as to where they

Here the jury is not going to get a disputed expert

18 I opinion on how much damage was caused by it. We're not — again,
19

we didn't pigeon hole him, "You have to give us a percentage

20

anyway you can." He said he couldn't.

21

This idea that this was caused by glaucoma, was kind of

22

this big issue versus other things. Assume that it was glaucoma.

23

I mean this is the fact most favorable to plaintiff. That

24

doesn't mean that they received substandard care, and it doesn't

25

mean that — because people can get blindness from glaucoma even
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when properly treated.

2

There was some implication that these healthcare

3

providers didn't do anything for Ms. Sohm while they were

4

treating her.

5

in her eye with a microscope to look at nerves. They were

6

changing medications.

7

procedures with her, and they were talking, they were doing

8

things, and that's clear. The fact is she did not return for —

9

she was supposed to return in 10 days.

That's clearly not the case. They were looking

Dr. Snow testified he discussed surgical

If things had been worse,

10

for all we know Dr. Snow would have rushed her into surgery that

11

she had two months later.

12

So again, I think this is why all these factors leading

13

up to these key questions to Dr. Styne, you know, how you parcel

14

these 15 factors out and he said he couldn't. The jury is not

15

going to be able to, either.

Thank you, your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Owens.

17

MR. MORTON:

18

Your Honor, brief opportunity for

(inaudible) rebuttal?

19

THE COURT: Sure.

20

MR. MORTON:

Thank you. What the experts can do, and

21

this is a —

this is a situation where you're dealing with a

22

disease process, you're dealing with — and it is true that there

23

can be a loss of visual acuity associated with glaucoma in the

24

absence of negligence.

25

something that's progressive?

Is that loss a sudden onset?
Is it something —

Is it

and you go
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through that history, and that's why the fact testimony in this

2

case and the expert testimony are inextricably intertwined.

3

You cannot separate the two.

4

You have to have the history of the patient combined

5

with the opinion of the expert to say, you know, this would fall

6

out of the realm.

7

where he simply testifies that the —

8

to fumble through this, but he summarizes one sentence after he's

9

just —

Dr. Styne references this in several instances
and I'm —

I don't want

and I understand he's not using the magic words here.

10

After he summarizes his breaches of the standard of care, he

11

says, "Therefore, as a result I believe all of these things and

12

everything that led up to those final visits contributed to this

13

patient's dramatic loss of vision." Let me just see if I can —

14

he says, "There's a much greater likelihood that she would not

15

have suffered these visual field losses to this degree had there

16

been intervention."

17

We get hung up on this degree.

I mean this woman is

18

functionally blind.

19

of just outrageous high pressures that were not responding to

20

the same treatments that were given.

21

that year to do any emergency surgery or even recommend the same.

22

It all culminated after tolerating a year

There was no attempt during

As a matter of fact, to demonstrate how cavalier they

23

were, you probably read Dr. Ricks little poem about attitude that

24

he wrote on a prescription pad and gave to —

25

It's very offensive because it shows that this is a condition

it's in our brief.
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"Come back in two weeks when

2

Dr. Snow is back from vacation."

3

got pressures like this, when you've got this kind of problem

4

where the patient comes in and is complaining of pain and milky

5

vision and all of that, you don't tell them to come back in two

6

weeks.

7

Dr. Styne is saying when you've

She had these classic signs of build up to this loss

8

of visual acuity.

9

condition was in fact brought about by medical negligence. It's

10
11

So a jury could very easily find that her

just not an appropriate issue to decide on summary judgment.
THE COURT: Thank you. Well, thank you, Counsel. I

12

have reviewed the memoranda.

They're really excellently done,

13

and I appreciate the arguments.

14

depositions or the other things cited in the materials I have, so

15

I'll have to have time to do that, and I'll get a decision to you

16

in writing.

I have not read through the

17

MR. MORTON:

Thank you, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Okay.

19

MR. NELSON: Thank you, your Honor.

20

(Hearing concluded)
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